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If there is a consensus in the literature on the Yugoslav wars of succession, 
it is that Franjo Tuđman was not merely a nationalist, but an authoritarian 
nationalist. Few today would doubt that judgment, but prior to 1993, 
Tuđman’s reputation was more moderate. Tuđman was not simply a 
nationalist. He had fought with the Partisans; he had written a prizewinning 
book on partisan warfare and another praising Tito; he had served on 
the board of Yugoslavia’s Military Encyclopedia; and he had been the first 
Director of the Institute for the Workers’ Movement in Croatia, handpicked 
for the job by the Party hierarchy. Jailed in 1972 for his efforts to liberalize 
Yugoslavia’s Communist system and again in 1981 for speaking to foreign 
journalists and besmirching the image of Yugoslavia, Tuđman became a 
reluctant dissident during the 1970s. However, prior to 1989, most scholars 
did not consider him a dangerous nationalist or a racist or authoritarian, 
so it seems reasonable to ask how and when he came to be portrayed as an 
“authoritarian nationalist” who has been regularly paired with the Serbian 
leader Slobodan Milošević.
If there is a consensus in the literature on the Yugoslav wars of succes-
sion, it is that Franjo Tuđman was not merely a nationalist, but an authori-
tarian nationalist. Few today would doubt that judgment, but prior to 1993, 
Tuđman’s reputation was more moderate. Almost a decade before he was 
elected President of Croatia, Gale Stokes portrayed him as a dissident whose 
nationalism was essentially benign and whose focus on the “national question” 
was “salutary,”1 and in 1991 Ivo Banac wrote that Tuđman was “decidedly not 
an Ustaša.”2 Both observations seemed obvious; Tuđman had fought with the 
✳ James J. Sadkovich, Ph. D., Leiden, Netherlands
1 Gale Stokes, Review, American Historical Review, 87 (3) (June 1982), pp. 773-4.
2 Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 180, 
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Partisans and he had written one of the few accounts in English of the NDH, 
the Independent State of Croatia created by the Ustaša—a Marxist analysis 
that roundly condemned the Croatian nationalist movement and its wartime 
state as fascist.3 So he was not an Ustaša. But he was certainly a nationalist; his 
own writings left no doubt on that score. He was also a Communist and an 
influential historian, whom Wayne Vucinich considered one of two prominent 
proponents of a Croatian interpretation of Yugoslav historiography.4
Tuđman was therefore not simply a nationalist. He had fought with the 
Partisans; he had written a prizewinning book on partisan warfare and another 
praising Tito; he had served on the board of Yugoslavia’s Military Encyclopedia;5 
and he had been the first Director of the Institute for the Workers’ Movement 
in Croatia, handpicked for the job by the Party hierarchy. During the 1960s, 
he had joined the board of Matica Hrvatska’s reformist publication, Tjednik; he 
had helped to refurbish Stjepan Radić’s image; and he had worked closely with 
Većeslav Holjevac on the staff of the immigrant organization, Matica iseljeni-
ka.6 He was one of the leaders of the reformist movement known variously as 
maspok (mass movement), the “Croatian national movement,” and the “Croa-
tian Spring,” and his name appeared on a list of fifty key “counter revolutionar-
ies” along with those of the leaders of Croatia’s League of Communists, Miko 
Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar; the Director of Croatia’s largest publishing 
house (Vjesnik), Božidar Novak; and two prominent student leaders, Dražen 
Budiša, and Ivan Zvonimir Čičak.7 Jailed in 1972 for his efforts to liberalize Yu-
believed that Croatia was the object of “a vicious campaign designed to portray its leaders as 
latter-day Ustaša,” even though Franjo Tupman was “decidedly not an Ustaša.”
3 Franjo Tuđman, “The Independent State of Croatia as an Instrument of the Policy of the 
Occupation Powers in Yugoslavia, and the People’s Liberation Movement in Croatia from 1941 
to 1945,” in Les systèmes d’occupation en Yougoslavie 1941-1945. Rapports au 3a Congrès Interna-
tional sur l’Histoire de la Résistance européenne à Karlovy Vary, les 2-4 Septembre 1963 (Belgrade: 
Institut pour l’étude du mouvement ouvrier, 1963, and Tisak Grafičkog Zavoda Hrvatske, 1963).
4 The other was Vaso Bogdanov, Tuđman’s mentor and friend. Wayne S. Vucinich, “National-
ism and Communism,” in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Contemporary Yugoslavia. Twenty Years of So-
cialist Experiment (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 277-81; Franjo Tuđman, 
Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (Boulder CO: East European Monographs, 1981), and 
Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti: Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 
1989), translated into English as Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy (New York: 
M. Evans, 1996).
5 Tuđman wrote two major articles for the encyclopedia, “Narodnooslobodilački rat u 
Hrvatskoj,” Vojna enciklopedija, III (1960), and “Nova Jugoslavija-stvaranje nove Jugoslavije u 
oslobodilačkom ratu i u socijalističkoj revoluciji 1941-1945,” Vojna enciklopedija, IV (1961).
6 For a survey of biographies, see James J. Sadkovich, “Who Was Franjo Tupman?” East Eu-
ropean Politics and Studies 20 (November 2006), pp. 729-39; for a discussion of Tuđman’s intel-
lectual evolution, see J. J. Sadkovich, “Franjo Tupman : An Intellectual in Politics”.
7 For the Croatian Spring, see Zdenko Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945.-1991. Od 
zajedništva do razlaza (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), 379-466, and Ante Čuvalo, The Croatian 
National Movement, 1966-1972 (Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs, 1990), passim. For 
the list, see Božidar Novak, Hrvatsko novinarstvo u 20. stoljeću (Zagreb; Golden Marketing, 
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goslavia’s Communist system and again in 1981 for speaking to foreign jour-
nalists and besmirching the image of Yugoslavia, Tuđman became a reluctant 
dissident during the 1970s. However, prior to 1989, scholars like Gale Stokes 
and Wayne Vucinich did not consider him a dangerous nationalist or a racist 
or authoritarian, so it seems reasonable to ask how and when he came to be 
portrayed as an “authoritarian nationalist” who has been regularly paired with 
the Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević.
The answer to that question is partly historical and partly historiographical. 
The historical part of the answer lies both in the Communist regime’s crack-
down on reformists during the 1970s and its use of the sobriquets “nationalist” 
and “Ustaša” to discredit Croatian reformers and in the dearth of easily avail-
able informed and nonpartisan opinion regarding events in Yugoslavia after 
1989.8 Only a handful of “Western” scholars were familiar with the country and 
its history, and the majority of them tended to support the regime, which they 
viewed as a leader of the nonaligned movement and a novel experiment offer-
ing an alternative to the dominant ideological systems.9 As a result, journalists, 
politicians, pundits, and scholars unfamiliar with the country gleaned what lit-
tle information was easily available and integrated it into hurried analyses and 
ad hoc policy prescriptions.10 The historiographical part lies in the scholarly 
and popular literature about the former Yugoslavia, whose pro-Yugoslav and 
pro-Partisan bias necessarily carried a negative image of Croatia and Croatian 
nationalism, both of which were associated with separatism and the Axis.11 
Tehnička knjiga, 2005), pp. 610-612, 660-4, 679-80. Novak, the former Director of the Vjesnik 
Publishing House, believes Ivan Gošnjak, Secretary of Defense, sent Tuđman to Zagreb in 1961.
8 For example, Oskar Gruenwald, “Yugoslav Camp Literature: Rediscovering the Ghost of a 
Nation’s Part-Present-Future,” Slavic Review 46 (3/4) (Autumn 1987), pp. 513-528.
9 The tendency to identify with the Yugoslav variant of communism, which in turn was closely 
identified with Serbian communists, is clear in Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism. A 
Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945 (New York: Oxford, 1991), pp. 6, 95 ff., 115 ff., 
224 ff., who ignores the Croatian Spring but includes a reading on the Praxis group by “a Belgrade 
philosopher,” Mihailo Marković, that focuses on events in Belgrade. Published by the Croatian 
Philosophical Society of Zagreb from 1964 to 1974, the journal Praxis was edited by a “group of 
Yugoslav philosophers” (Gajo Petrović, Rudi Supek, and Danilo Pejović), and its editorial policy 
was Marxist and therefore pro-Yugoslav and anti-Croatian. Two of the three readings in the 
sections on self-management and the “new class” are by the Montenegrin, Milovan Ðilas, and 
one of three readings on nationalism is by “a Belgrade lawyer,” Veljko Guberina. Like Stokes, 
Gerson S. Sher, Praxis. Marxist Criticism and Dissent in Socialist Yugoslavia (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1977), was sympathetic to efforts by members of the Praxis group to 
reform Yugoslavia as a Marxist state, efforts criticized by the Croatian scholar,  Stanko M. Vujica, 
“The Humanist Marxism in Croatia,” Journal of Croatian Studies (1968-1969), pp. 3-40.
10 For a discussion of some of the problems regarding reporting by the media and analysis by 
the scholarly community, see James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998), passim.
11 Works sympathetic to Croatia were generally dismissed as nationalist or neo-Ustaša and 
were outnumbered by those hostile to Croatia or sympathetic to Serbia and Yugoslavia (both 
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This essay deals primarily with the second part of the question, although on 
occasion it discusses the history of the past two decades to set in context the 
historiography which influenced perceptions of Tuđman.
Was Tuđman a racist?
There had long been a tendency, particularly by those on the Left, to view 
Croatian nationalism as both conservative (because Croats had supported 
the Austrian monarchy in 1848 and fought with the Central Powers between 
1914 and 1918),12 and tainted (because members of the Ustaša regime had 
committed heinous war crimes).13 There were two corollaries to this point of 
view—one, that Yugoslavia, as John Fine wrote, was “a beautiful society,” the 
other, that Serbian nationalism was essentially democratic.14 Beginning in the 
the inter-war and postwar regimes), e.g., Stephen Clissold, Croat Separatism: Nationalism, 
Dissidence, and Terrorism (London Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1979); David Martin, 
Allied Betrayed. The Uncensored Story of Tito and Mihailovich (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946); J. 
B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York: Columbia UP, 1962); Ladislaus Hory and 
Martin Broszat, Der Kroatische Ustascha-Staat, 1941-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlaganstalt, 
1964); Paul N. Hehn, The German Struggle against Yugoslav Guerrillas in World war II. 
German Counter-Insurgency in Yugoslavia, 1941-1943 (New York: East European Quarterly, 
1979); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia. The British Role in Tito’s Grab for Power 1943-1944 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1990). For further discussion, see Ante Čuvalo, 
“Croatian Nationalism and the Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) in Anglo-American 
Publications. A Critical Assessment,” Journal of Croatian Studies (1989).
12 Karl Marx, Revolution and Counter-Revolution or Germany in 1848 (Ed., Eleanor Marx 
Aveling) (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952/1891), pp. 64-8, 78-9, 83-5, 99-101, 
saw Bohemia and Croatia as unable to “exist as a nation” on their own and fated to be absorbed 
“into a more energetic stock,” a fate they sought to avoid through the “ludicrous” doctrine of 
“Panslavism.” For Marx, Croatian and Bohemian Panslavists had served Russia in 1848-1849 
and “betrayed the revolutionary cause for the shadow of a nationality. . . .” He was particularly 
critical of Jelačić, “the leader of South Slavonian reaction,” whose “brigand hordes” had helped 
to defeat the revolutions in Vienna and Budapest and committed “un-heard of cruelties and 
infamies” in the Austrian capital.  Not “capable of an independent national life” Croats and other 
“petty” nations sought to avoid the “inevitable fate of these dying nations. . .to allow this process 
of dissolution and absorption by their stronger neighbours to complete itself ” by supporting 
“the side of despotism and reaction.” But this only made them “traitors to the popular cause” and 
placed them “in the position of outlaws in the eyes of all revolutionary nations.”
13 For discussion, see James J. Sadkovich, “Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman,” Review of 
Croatian History, 1 (2006), pp. 247-80.
14 John Fine, “Heretical Thoughts about the Postcommunist Transition,” in Norman M. Naimak 
and Holly Case, eds., Yugoslavia and Its Historians. Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 190-2, and Slavoj Žižek, Did Somebody 
Say Totalitarianism? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion (London: Verso, 2002), p. 231, 
notes a “plethora of standard Leftist prejudices and dogmas” that blinded “their perception of 
the Yugoslav crisis,” especially “the secret belief in the viability of Yugoslav self-management 
Socialism, and the notion that small nations like Slovenia (or Croatia) cannot actually function 
like modern democracies but, left to their own devices, necessarily regress to a proto-Fascist 
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1980s, there was also a concerted effort to “frame” events in Yugoslavia by 
referring to crimes committed in the NDH during World War II and to tar 
Tuđman, Croatia, and Croats as “Ustaša,” particularly by those individuals and 
organizations comprising what Brad Blitz has termed ASerbia’s war lobby.@15 
As heirs of the Ustaša, Croats as a people supposedly had an inclination to 
anti-Semitism and genocide, as the American anthropologist Robert Hayden 
suggested in East European Societies and Politics.  While “the Croats were not 
uniquely genocidal,” Hayden wrote, Franjo Tuđman had sought to “minimize 
the number of those killed, not just at Jasenovac, but during the Holocaust.” 
Hayden saw Tuđman’s “reference to Jasenovac as a ‘myth’” and his use of the 
phrase “final solution” as reflecting “a stunning disregard for the sentiments 
of Serbs,” which was not “only insulting to them but also ominous.” Accord-
ing to Hayden, Tuđman’s anti-Semitism and Croatia’s genocidal past explained 
why Croatia’s Serbs had no “reason to wish to remain in a nationalistic Croat 
state.”16 For Hayden, Tuđman was not only a nationalist, but a racist and a Ho-
locaust revisionist, both anti-Serbian and anti-Semitic.
Hayden’s comments about Tuđman and Croats in general were made in his 
response to an article published in East European Politics and Society by Ljubo 
Boban, one of Croatia’s leading Communist historians. Boban had sought to 
deflate myths that were damaging to Croatia and in their stead to offer care-
ful historical analysis. He had concluded that those who “manipulated” his-
tory to stoke hatred of Croatia were comparable to the Ustaša, Chetniks, and 
other racists who had pursued “genocidal policies” in the past, and he had 
called upon everyone to take Jasenovac as an example of why it was crucial to 
avoid stirring up ethnic hatred and to make every effort to avoid genocide in 
the future. These appear to be laudable sentiments, particularly in hindsight, 
but Boban had also indirectly exonerated Tuđman of the charge that he was 
a Jasenovac (and, by extension, Holocaust) revisionist—as Hayden would ar-
gue in his response—by discussing a 1964 census by Yugoslavia’s Institute of 
Statistics. Tuđman had based his discussions on the same census, which had 
estimated that 346,740 Serbs had perished during World War II, a lower num-
ber than the estimates by Bogoljub Kočović and Vladimir Žerjavić, whose later 
studies had, respectively, estimated that between 487,000 and 530,000 Serbs 
had died during the war. However, all these estimates were well below claims 
that 700,000 to a million Serbs had died at the Ustaša concentration camp of 
‘closed’ community (in clear contrast to Serbia, whose potential as a modern democratic state 
is never put in doubt).”
15 Brad K. Blitz, “Serbia’s War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites,” in Stjepan Meštrović 
and Thomas Cushman, eds., This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New 
York University Press, 1996).
16 Robert M. Hayden, “Balancing Discussion of Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” 
East European Politics and Society 6 (1992), pp. 207-210.
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Jasenovac alone, a number Tuđman had repeatedly questioned. Boban seemed 
to support the Croatian dissident by referring to the 1964 report and by not-
ing that the best estimate was that no more than 70,000 people had perished 
at Jasenovac. He also noted, as had Tuđman, that while the majority of victims 
had been Serbs, others had also died at the camp, including Jews, Gypsies, and 
Croats. Finally, Boban raised the question of whether Jasenovac had been a 
“death camp,” given that the regime’s political opponents, including the Presi-
dent of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladimir Maček, had been interned there, 
and that thousands had survived internment.17
Vladimir Žerjavić was more explicit than Boban, noting that the figures 
published by Tuđman were actually “fairly close to the actual ones,” given that 
the 1964 Yugoslav census had listed 61,383 victims at Jasenovac and its two 
satellite camps (Stara Gradiška and Gradina), as well as in Gospić-Jadovno.18 
The implication that Tuđman’s figures were essentially accurate, given the 
information available to him, appears to be what troubled Hayden, who did 
not contest Boban’s numbers, but rather the “meaning” that Boban had as-
signed to them.19 Like Boban, Tuđman had also sought to be meticulous in his 
discussion of the actual numbers of war victims. At his trial in 1981, he had 
argued that Yugoslavia’s demographic loss had been 2.18 million, of whom 
some 800,000 had actually perished. He had estimated that 450,000 of the de-
mographic losses had been due to a depressed birth rate, 250,000 to emigra-
tion, and 700,000 to political persecution after 1945.20 His estimate that some 
60,000 had died at Jasenovac was somewhat lower than the figures arrived at 
later by Boban, Kočović, and Žerjavić,21 but that was because in 1981 Tuđman 
was working from the 1964 census, which listed 50,002 dead at Jasenovac and 
9,587 at Stara Gradiška, a total of 59,589.22 These are the figures that Tuđman 
most often cited, usually with the observation that even if “only” 60,000 had 
17 Ljubo Boban, “Note and Comments: Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” East 
European Politics and Society 4 (1990), pp. 580-92, and Boban’s rebuttal to Hayden’s response, 
“Still More Balance on Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” East European Politics and 
Society 6 (1992), pp. 213-217. The question is a vexed one, but the core of the question regards 
numbers, as Boban noted, if 60,000 to 70,000 perished at Jasenovac, that was horrible, but if 
700,000 to a million had done so, the Croats as a people were inculpated in the deaths.
18 Vladimir Žerjavić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), 
p. 34.
19 Hayden, “Balancing Discussion of Jasenovac,” pp. 207-208.
20 Franjo Tuđman, Na suđenju dr. Tuđmanu sudilo se Hrvatskoj (London: United Publishers, 
1981), pp. 16-17.
21 In 1985, Kočović estimated that 70,000 had perished at the Jasenovac complex, and in 
the early 1990s Žerjavić estimated that a maximum of 83,000 had perished in Ustaša camps, 
including some 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs, 12,000 Croats and Muslims, 13,000 Jews, and 10,000 
Roma. Bogoljub Kočović, Žrtve Drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Naše delo, 1985), 
passim, and Žerjavić, Opsesije, op. cit.
22 Jasenovac Foundation, online at http://www.jusp-jasenovac.hr/logor.html.
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died at Jasenovac, that was a terrible tragedy and did not lessen the guilt of 
those responsible.23
So it seems that Tuđman was neither a racist nor a Holocaust denier, but 
rather a historian using the most accurate figures available at the time he was 
writing. But few people read Serbian or Croatian, and Boban’s article was 
rarely cited. Nor did most of those writing on the wars of succession bother 
reading the literature on World War II. Journalists and scholars consulted the 
internet, which offered excerpts from Tuđman’s work selected to demonstrate 
his racism24; they read the literature in English, which included sensational 
accounts of Ustaša war crimes25; and they listened to the head of Serbia’s Mu-
seum of the Victims of Genocide in Belgrade, Milan Bulajić, who continued 
to cite the higher figures and to claim that the Jasenovac complex had covered 
210 square kilometers, not the 1.4 to 4.0 square kilometers the camps actually 
occupied.26 So it is not surprising that journalists and scholars, even the most 
conscientious and best intentioned, continued to view Tuđman as a racist, nor 
that in 1995 Christopher Bennett could still write that Tuđman had acted as 
“an apologist for the NDH,” because he had “revised” the figures for war vic-
tims downward.27
The necessary nationalist
But if Tuđman was not a racist, an apologist for the NDH, or a Holocaust 
revisionist, he was a nationalist, and therefore anathema both to those who 
viewed nationalism per se as an anachronism that threatened individual hu-
man rights and to those who saw Croatian nationalism as a recrudescence of 
an extreme variant of nationalism that was both anti-Semitic and anti-Serb. 
He was also unacceptable to Leftists who viewed nationalism as a reactionary 
23 Franjo Tuđman, Usudbene povjestice (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1995), pp. 651-3, 
664-7, and passim.
24 For example, Vida Janković and Svetlana Raivcević, “The Master Mind of Today’s Croatia’s 
Democracy. Franjo Tudjman’s Main [sic] Kampf,” posted December 21, 1996.
25 For example, Edmond Paris, Genocide in Satellite Croatia, 1941-1945 (Chicago, n.d.).
26 Milan Bulajić, who published Tudjman’s ‘Jasenovac Myth’: Genocide against Serbs, Jews, and 
Gypsies (Belgrade: Stručna knjiga, 1994), later accepted the lower figures, arguing that he had 
used the best figures available at the time in 1994, but he claimed Croatian military operations 
in 1995 were, like Jasenovac, “genocide against the Serbs in Croatia.” Milan Bulajić, “Preface to 
the Balkan Auschwitz,” online at http://www.jasenovac.org/news_read.php?nID’54. For more 
accurate information on the Jasenovac complex, see Mario Kevo, “Počeci jasenovačkog lgora i 
pojmovna (terminološka) problematika sustava jasenovačkih logora,” in Hans-Georg Fleck and 
Igor Graovac, eds., Dijalog povjesničara-istoričara (Zagreb: Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, 2005), 
pp. 574-85, and Vladimir Žerjavić, “The Inventions and Lies of Dr. Bulajić on Internet,” online 
at http://www.croatianhistory.net/etf/bul.html, posted in 1995, consulted October 2007.
27 Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse. Causes, Course and Consequences 
(London: Hurst & Cpy., 1995), pp. 128-9.
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ideological construct and to those who saw the loose confederation proposed 
in 1990 by Tuđman and Slovenia’s president, Milan Kučan, as subverting Yugo-
slavia. In many ways, Tuđman was the indispensable politician needed to ex-
plain Yugoslavia’s demise as a function of vicious nationalists seeking to create 
ethnically pure states—a simple, elegant, parsimonious explanation congruent 
with the political culture of the 1990s, which rejected nationalism in favor of 
globalism and collective rights in favor of individual rights. But it is worth re-
membering that elegant theories are not descriptions of real phenomena; they 
are ideal types constructed from data that is neither comparable nor necessar-
ily accurate.28
Even setting the vagaries of theory aside, there seems to have been a con-
sensus regarding Tuđman that extended well beyond the academic commu-
nity. Among those who considered the Croatian leader a dangerous national-
ist were such influential journalists as David Binder, John Burns, Alexander 
Cockburn, Duško Doder, Misha Glenny, Chris Hedges, Christopher Hitchens, 
Robert Kaplan, Noel Malcolm, William Pfaff, Silvia Poggioli, David Rieff, A. 
M. Rosenthal, Chuck Sudetic, and Ed Vulliamy. Their reports were aired on the 
BBC, NPR, PBS, and CNN, and their articles and op. ed. pieces and editorials 
appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Guardian, Harper’s, The New Republic, The 
New York Review of Books, The New York Times, The New Yorker and The Wash-
ington Post.29 Both journalists and academics framed the conflicts in Croatia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, determined the news pegs on which information 
was hung, and shaped opinion in the West. Because they tended to reflect the 
existing literature and the views of their contacts, few of whom were sympa-
thetic to the HDZ or to Croatia, the image of Tuđman they offered was that of 
an authoritarian nationalist who suppressed his opponents at home and sup-
ported subversives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.30
It was therefore not surprising that members of NGOs, political leaders, the 
informed public and those diplomats, journalists, and academics not familiar 
28 Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (London: University College of London 
Press, 1997), pp. 3-41; also Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2000), esp. pp. 54-8.
29 For stereotyping of Croats by the American media, see James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media 
and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Westport CT: Praeger, 1998), pp. 122-33, and passim.
30 Sadkovich, “Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman,” passim, and discussion below.  Particularly 
influential was the anti-Croatian and pro-Serbian travelogue by Rebecca West, Black Lamb and 
Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia (New York: Viking, 1941/53). Most books dealt with 
Yugoslavia and tended to present Croats in a negative light, e.g., Duško Doder, The Yugoslavs 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 21, wrote that Croats nursed “an animosity toward the Serbs 
that seems to date back to their tribal period,” but their “elite” had been “politically emasculated” 
and took refuge in “a realm of intellectual opposition,” giving “Croatian nationalism” its 
“exclusivist tone” and disposing Croats to “covertly fear and overtly despite” Serbs. The cover 
blurb cited The New Yorker, which had praised Doder’s works as “An enthralling, an honest, and 
an illuminating book.”
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with Yugoslavia’s history tended to view Tuđman and the HDZ in a negative 
light. Their information came from news reports, from diplomat contacts, and 
from locals, most of who appear to have been sympathetic to Yugoslavia, to 
have viewed Serbs as a tragic but noble people, and to have dismissed Tuđman 
and his party as “separatists.”31 This predisposition to view events through a 
distorted historical lens was exacerbated by a tendency to deal with local lead-
ers in an evenhanded manner. For example, during 1990 and 1991, Helsinki 
Watch listed minor human rights violations in Croatia with major ones in 
Serbia, thereby conflating workplace discrimination with physical abuse, and 
pairing Tuđman with Milošević as an authoritarian leader.32 Diplomats and 
statesmen, including the acting American Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagle-
burger, and the German Foreign Minister, Hans Dietrich Genscher, repeat-
edly voiced their support for Yugoslavia through mid 1991, thereby casting 
Tuđman as a bothersome, and unwelcome, separatist.33 As Slaven Letica and 
Anto Knežević have demonstrated, there was also a concerted campaign to 
depict Tuđman as an anti-Semite and a Holocaust revisionist, even though he 
publicly condemned the NDH, removed passages that some found offensive 
from the American version of his magnus opus, and expressed his solidarity 
with the Jewish community and his support for Israel.34 Indeed, Croatia tended 
to be more open and more tolerant than other Yugoslav republics, including 
Slovenia, and not only did Freedom House never list Croatia as authoritarian, 
31 For example, David Newhouse, “Diplomatic Round: Dodging the Problem,” New Yorker, 24 
August 1992, and Sadkovich The U.S. Media, 122-62, and passim.
32 For example, Helsinki Watch, Letter to F. Tudjman, 13 February 1992; Letter to S. Milošević 
and B. Adžić., 21 January 1992; and Yugoslavia. Human Rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict 
(Washington DC, September 1991). Also see United States Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Minority Rights. Problems, Parameters, and Patterns in the CSCE Context 
(Washington, D.C., no date, but c. 1991), and Report on the U.S. Helsinki Commission Delegation 
Visit to Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Albania (Codel DeConcini), (Washington, D.C., 22-28 March 
1991).
33 Renéo Lukić, L’agonie yougoslave (1986-2003). Les États-Unis et l’Europe face aux guerres 
balkaniques (Quebec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2003), esp. 255, 267-72; also Hans 
Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany’s 
Reunification (New York: Broadway Books, 1998), passim, and John Roy Major, John Major: The 
Autobiography (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), passim.
34 Anto Knežević, An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda (Zagreb: Domovina TT, 1992), passim; 
and Slaven Letica, Političko pleme (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 1998), pp. 271-82, for a 
brief, but detailed, rebuttal of charges that Tuđman was an anti-Semite. Letica notes that a 1993 
public opinion survey found that only five to seven percent of Croats displayed anti-Semitic 
attitudes, a much lower percentage of the population than in Western Europe or the United 
States. He also cites Tuđman’s January 1992 letter to the Congress of the United States in which 
the Croatian President condemned “in the strongest manner possible” Nazi Germany and the 
NDH for committing “genocide” against “Jews, Gypsies, Croats, Serbs, and other groups,” and 
Tuđman’s letter to the President of B’nai B’rith noting that he had revised Bespuća to remove any 
passages that might be offensive to Jews.
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it earned ratings close to those of Bulgaria and Romania, who have been ad-
mitted to the European Union.35
Nonetheless, for many in the West, Tuđman’s leadership of the avowedly 
nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Hrvastska Demokratska Zajed-
nica) and his party’s electoral victory in May 1990 reinforced their negative 
image of both Tuđman and Croatia. It was therefore not surprising that in 
the summer of 1991, as JNA units attacked Slovenia and Croatia, Dennison 
Rusinow, author of one of the standard works on Titoist Yugoslavia and pro-
fessor emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh, cautioned the readers of the 
influential policy journal Foreign Affairs that Tuđman and his party posed a 
threat. Rusinow reported that the HDZ leader had been “a wartime partisan 
general” [sic’he was a major] and “a former political prisoner,” but he also 
noted that Tuđman had been jailed “for his alleged ‘nationalist-separatist’ role 
[sic’Tuđman advocated liberalizing the Yugoslav regime, not independence for 
Croatia] in the Croatian Spring” and was now placating “the most nationalist 
wing” of his party, “whose utterances about Serbs” were essentially “racist.” 
Even though Tuđman’s rhetoric was moderate and conciliatory, particularly 
when compared to the intransigent and hostile rhetoric of Serbian leaders and 
the Serbian media, and even though he promised Croatia’s Serbs full cultural 
autonomy and some local political control,36 Rusinow seemed to imply that 
he was a dangerous nationalist and that Croatia’s Serbs were merely reacting 
to the threat posed by the HDZ, which controlled Croatia’s government.  The 
American academic therefore urged the United States and Europe to give “un-
conditional support” to a unified Yugoslavia in order to avert a tragedy.37
35 See Randy Hodson, Duško Sekulić, and Garth Massey, “National Tolerance in the Former 
Yugoslavia,” American Journal of Sociology, 99 (6) (May, 1994), pp. 1534-58; Nikolai Botev, 
“Where East Meets West: Ethnic Intermarriage in the Former Yugoslavia, 1962-1989,” American 
Sociological Review 59 (1994), pp. 461-80; and Adrian Karatnycky, et al., eds., Nations in Transit. 
Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East Central Europe and the Nearby Independent States 
(Freedom House, 1999), passim.
36   For example, Tuđman’s interviews with the foreign media, in which he condemned the 
NDH, expressed his desire to collaborate with Croatia’s Serbs, to resolve Croatia’s differences 
with Serbia, and to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis threatening Yugoslavia in 1990-1991 
and subsequently to the conflicts of 1991-1995; see Franjo Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ svijetu: 
Razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima (Zagreb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za 
povijest, 1999), passim; for Serbian rhetoric and viciously anti-Croatian cartoons, see Ivo Banac, 
Protiv straha. Članci, izjave i javni nastupi, 1987-1992. (Zagreb: Slon, 1992), passim, and Nikica 
Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1995. (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička knjiga, 
2005), passim.
37 Dennison Rusinow, “Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?” Foreign Affairs 83 (Summer 1991), pp. 
43-59. Rusinow’s The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California 
Press, 1977), pp. xiii, 2, 6-14, passim, was sympathetic to the creation of the Yugoslav state 
in 1918 (“the nearly complete fulfillment” of a south Slav “dream”), the Partisan movement 
(which combined “hierarchical links with flexibility and generous room for autonomous local 
initiative”), the concepts of bratstvo i jedinstvo (brotherhood and unity), and Yugoslavia’s 
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Creating a new image, 1991-1993
During his visit to Yugoslavia in June 1991, James Baker appeared to do 
just that.38 But by supporting a unitary Yugoslavia, Baker also tacitly sup-
ported plans to use force to suppress nationalists in Slovenia and Croatia, and 
shortly after his visit the Yugoslav army attacked Slovenia. Although Croatia 
remained neutral, Serb forces, supported by the Army, stepped up their attacks 
on Croatian villages over the summer. That autumn, as fighting intensified in 
Croatia and Serb militia drove tens of thousands of Croats from their homes, 
Slavic Review, the official organ of the AAASS (American Association for the 
Advancement of Slavic Studies), published a short essay by Alex Dragnich, 
professor emeritus at Vanderbilt, who argued that Serbs had never exercised 
“hegemony” over other nationalities in Yugoslavia, but had actually sacrificed 
their national interests to create a multinational state.39 In the spring, fall, and 
early winter, The New Republic, then an influential political journal, published 
essays by the American journalist Robert Kaplan, who portrayed Croatia as 
a breeding ground for racists and described Tuđman as an anti-Semite com-
mitted to the destruction of its Serbian citizens.40 The British historian Eric 
Hobsbawm also warned that nationalism per se was dangerous and suggested 
that some states were simply too small to be viable in the pages of The Na-
tion, a left-wing publication whose columnists regularly savaged Tuđman and 
Croatia.41
So while Slovenia was allowed to go its own way, ostensibly because it had 
a robust civil society but in reality because it had no sizeable Serb minority, 
Croatia was portrayed as a small, barely viable state led by a vicious national-
ist. Hobsbawm returned to the attack in 1992 in the pages of Anthropology 
Today, warning the journal’s readers that “ethnic politics” inevitably ‘mutate’ 
into “national separatism” and “national xenophobia,” adducing Croatia as an 
example.42  In 1992, the British journalist Misha Glenny equated Milošević, 
experiments with self-management (the “Yugoslav experiment with an independent and novel 
‘road to socialism’”). Rusinow also distinguished Croatian from Serbian collaboration, referring 
to the Croat leader Ante Pavelić as a “super-Quisling” but to the Serb collaborator Milan Nedić 
as “a man who did the enemy’s bidding in the tragic hope of saving [his] peoples from a still 
worse fate.”
38 Thomas L. Friedman, “Baker Urges End to Yugoslav Rift,” New York Times, 22 June 1991.
39 Alex N. Dragnich, “The Anatomy of a Myth: Serbian Hegemony,” Slavic Review 50 (3) 
(Autumn 1991), pp. 659-662.
40 Robert D. Kaplan, “Bloody Balkans,” The New Republic, 8 April 1991; “Yugo First,” The New 
Republic, 2 September 1991; “Croatianism,” The New Republic, 25 November 1991.
41 Eric Hobsbawm, “The Perils of the New Nationalism,” The Nation, November 4, 1991. Also 
Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation, 29 March 1993, 23 October 1995, 20 
November 1995, and 25 November 1995; Alexander Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation, 31 
Aug.-7 Sept. 1992; Anthony Borden, “Zagreb Speaks,” Nation, 28 August-4 September 1995.
42 E. J. Hobsbawm and David J. Kertzer, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today,” 
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Tuđman, and their respective nationalisms as the primary causes of Yugosla-
via’s problems in the pages of The New York Review of Books,43 required read-
ing for many of America’s intellectual elite, while Robert Hayden and his wife, 
Milica Bakić-Hayden, deployed postmodern arguments to cast Croats as chau-
vinists in Slavic Review,44 which also published another article by Hayden, who 
seemed to imply that Tuđman approved of genocide.45 Not only was Tuđman 
presented as a dangerous nationalist, he was also portrayed as a racist who was 
predisposed to genocide. During 1992, major publishing houses also issued 
works by a congeries of authors who, despite their political and ideological 
differences, all cast Tuđman and Croatia in a negative light—Misha Glenny’s 
The Fall of Yugoslavia (Penguin); Mark Thompson’s A Paper House (Vintage); 
Alex Dragnich’s Serbs and Croats (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich), and John Za-
metica’s The Yugoslav Conflict (Brassey and the International Institute of Stra-
tegic Studies).46
In 1993, Oxford University Press issued a survey of post-1989 Eastern Eu-
rope by Gale Stokes, a professor at Rice University, who distinguished Ser-
bia’s democratic nationalism from Croatia’s chauvinistic nationalism and who 
seemed to imply that Croats bore a burden of genocidal guilt when he criti-
cized Tuđman’s government for failing to “apologize” and “atone” for Ustaša 
actions during World War II.47 Apparently, Tuđman’s expression of regret 
that the Jewish community in Croatia had been the victim of genocide by the 
Anthropology Today, 8 (1) (February 1992), pp. 3-8, also claimed that the “Yugoslav civil war” 
was being fought only by “activist minorities” and “professionals,” an observation that would 
have struck those serving in Croatia’s local militia units as less than well-informed.
43 Misha Glenny, “The Massacre of Yugoslavia,” New York Review of Books, 30 January 1992, 
and “The Revenger’s Tragedy,” New York Review of Books, 13 August 1992.
44 Robert Hayden and Milica Bakić-Hayden, “Orientalist Variations on the Theme ‘Balkan’: 
Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics,” Slavic Review 51 (1) (Spring 1992), 
pp. 1-15.
45 Robert Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Former Yugoslav Republics,” Slavic 
Review 51 (4) (Winter 1992), pp. 654-73, and his comments above, “Balancing Discussion of 
Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” pp. 208-210, also labeled Ante Starčević a “racist” 
and sought to link his supposedly “racist” doctrine to Tuđman and to Croatian nationalism in 
general.
46 Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia. The Third Balkan War (New York: Penguin, 1992), 
passim; Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats. The Struggle in Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1992), passim; Mark Thompson, A Paper House. The Ending of Yugoslavia 
(London: Vintage, 1992), passim; John Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict (London: IISS/
Brassey, 1992), passim, and his op. ed. piece, “Yugoslavia: Now Comes the Avoidable Breakup,” 
International Herald Tribune, 12 August 1991, in which Zametica labels the reform movement 
in Croatia during the 1960s as “nationalist” and blames “the rise of nationalism” for Yugoslavia’s 
problems.
47  Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down. The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 212-213, 218, 227.
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Ustaša state was not enough to satisfy the American academic.48 Three other 
books also appeared in 1993 that were hostile to Croatia—Robert Kaplan’s 
popular Balkan Ghosts (St. Martin’s), which depicted Croats as religious fanat-
ics; Lenard Cohen’s widely read Broken Bonds (Westview), which presented 
Tuđman’s government as authoritarian and the Serb rebellion in Croatia as jus-
tified; and Slavenka Drakulić‘s postmodern, middle-class lament, The Balkan 
Express (HarperPerennial).49
Drakulić‘s work echoed Glenny, Cohen, and Kaplan in suggesting that 
both Croats and Serbs—and the weight of history and symbols and a centu-
ries-long build-up of misunderstanding and hatred—were responsible for the 
war in Croatia. In the spring of 1993, Harper’s published Drakulić‘s letter to 
her daughter in which she blamed both sides for the fighting and singled out 
nationalism (Athe tallying up of war victims, justification of war criminals, 
the resuscitating of old national myths, the revival of religion on both the 
Catholic and the Orthodox sides”) as the main cause of the country’s prob-
lems. By blaming nationalism and ignoring what Serbian and Croatian leaders 
had actually said and done, Drakulić privileged an abstraction over reality and 
implied that both Serbs and Croats, rather than particular individuals and in-
stitutions, had caused the conflicts that accompanied Yugoslavia’s dissolution, 
thereby transforming what Croats saw as a fight to defend their homeland into 
something both more complex and more sinister. If less than rigorous, she 
was typical of a postmodern tendency to ignore facts in favor of impressions 
which made it more difficult to discern reality in Croatia and all but impos-
sible to establish the “truth” regarding Tuđman’s attitudes and actions. A luke-
warm Communist who believed most Croats had joined Yugoslavia’s League of 
Communists to further their careers, Drakulić left for Ljubljana in September 
1991 when the war in Croatia became serious. Returning to Zagreb in No-
vember, she greeted the truce in January 1992 with ambivalence, wondering 
whether she could “love” her “new country” whose “independence stinks of 
death,” an odd piece of introspection, given the bloody history of her “old” 
country. Although Ivo Banac dismissed her as displaying “a studied ignorance 
of history” and Beverly Allen criticized her for engaging “in the worst kind of 
blaming the victim,” DrakuliĆ undoubtedly influenced opinion on the Left; a 
major American publishing house issued her work, and she placed articles in 
Harper’s and The Nation, which praised her Balkan Express as “firsthand war 
48 Letica, Političko pleme, p. 281. On 21 January 1992, Tuđman wrote, “Duboko žalim zbog 
činjenice što je židovska zajednica u Hrvatskoj bila žrtvom, kao dio holokausta 2. Svjetskog rata.” 
(“I deeply regret that the Jewish community in Croatia was a victim of the Holocaust. . . .”)
49 Robert J. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts.  A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), 
passim; Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder: Westview, 
1993), passim; and Slavenka Drakulić, The Balkan Express. Fragments from the Other Side of War 
(New York: HarperPerennial, 1993), passim.
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reporting” that revealed “the true complexity of the crisis and the enormity of 
the task of reconciliation.”50
In August 1993, Bette Denich, like Hayden an anthropologist, argued in 
Anthropology of East Europe Review that nationalists were “unmaking” “multi-
ethnicity” in Yugoslavia. A year later, in American Ethnologist, she accused 
Tuđman of having imposed an Ustaša vocabulary on Croatians. “Trouble,” 
Denich wrote, “started when the new government in Zagreb acted to install 
the symbols of its domination throughout Croatia,” whose lack of a “demo-
cratic system” left “Serbian nationalists” no choice but to defend themselves 
against “extreme Croatian nationalists.”51 That autumn, Hayden used the pages 
of Anthropology of East Europe and Edward Said’s concept of “orientalism” to 
accuse Stjepan Meštrović, a sociologist at Texas A&M University, of writing an 
“Orientalist discourse” and to argue that the “chauvinistic” “orientations” of 
Yugoslav politicians and intellectuals had “fed” the “civil war” of 1991-1992. 
“Absurdities,” Hayden argued, lead to “atrocities,” and since all “successful 
political movements” in Yugoslavia, including the HDZ, had “been based on 
absurdities,” atrocities naturally followed their assumption of power, albeit 
through the mechanism of democratic elections.52
Such abstract arguments muddied analysis by submerging actual events 
beneath a slurry of heuristic language and ignoring the actions of individu-
als and institutions in favor of insinuating that all nationalisms were equally 
vicious and all nationalists equally culpable. In effect, Drakulić, Hayden, and 
Denich diffused responsibility for the descent into war and mass murder in 
Yugoslavia by attributing the federation’s problems to nationalism and nation-
alists, in particular Tuđman and the HDZ. In the summer of 1993, as Croats 
and Muslims squared off in Central Bosnia, Duško Doder, a journalist with 
The Washington Post, rehearsed the specific charges against Tuđman and Croa-
tia in the pages of Foreign Affairs. He labeled Ante Starčević, who had formu-
lated many of the basic tenets of Croatian nationalism, a “racist”; insisted that 
Tuđman had conspired with Milošević to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
50 Slavenka Drakulić, Harper’s, May 1993, reprinted in The Balkan Express: Fragments from 
the Other Side of War (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993), pp. 130-3, also 58-9, and passim; 
Ivo Banac, “Misreading the Balkans,” Foreign Policy, 93 (Winter 1993), pp. 176-7; Beverly 
Allen, Rape Warfare. The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: 
University of Minneapolis Press, 1996), p. 93. DrakuliĆ appears to have belonged to the 
generation of communists who had no faith in communism described by Andras Bozoki, “The 
End of Postcommunism,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, East European 
Studies, No. 306, http://www.wilsoncenter.org.
51 Bette Denich’s “Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival 
of Genocide,” American Ethnologist 21 (2) (May 1994), pp. 367-90, and “Unmaking Multi-
Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 11 (1-
2), (August 1993), passim.
52 Robert M. Hayden, “The Triumph of Chauvinistic Nationalisms in Yugoslavia: Bleak 
Implications for Anthropology,” Anthropology of East Europe Review 11 (1-2) (Autumn 1993).
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and accused “both sides” of engaging in “ethnic cleansing.” He also argued that 
if Slovenes and Croats had “the right to secede,” then Serbs in Croatia and Bos-
nia and Herzegovina “had an equally justifiable right to remain in Yugoslavia”; 
he blamed Croats and “their European allies” for having “inflamed” the war 
in Croatia; and he criticized Tuđman for having “refused to disown the fascist 
Croatia” [sic] and “instead revived its symbols.” According to Doder, Tuđman’s 
government had “replaced” the Cyrillic script with a Latin one and denied 
Serbs “any kind of political autonomy,” while “his supporters conjured up im-
ages of a fascist spirit stalking” Croatia.53
Given the venue, Doder’s views were certainly read by America’s top pol-
icy-makers and leading intellectuals, and given the prestige attached to arti-
cles in Foreign Affairs, it is safe to assume, particularly given Rusinow’s earlier 
piece, that many accepted Doder’s claims. If they wanted confirmation, they 
could read Bogdan Denitch, a sociologist and a socialist, who condemned 
not only nationalism, but also Tuđman and the HDZ, in a book published by 
the University of Minnesota Press.54 Or they could consult the reports of the 
Croatian Helsinki Committee (CHC) and the indictments of the ICTY, both 
established in 1993, two years after Denitch created his own NGO, Transition 
to Democracy.55
The ICTY’s policy of indicting members of all belligerent groups rein-
forced claims that Tuđman and Milošević, like their respective nationalisms, 
were similar. When the Prosecution at the ICTY later named Tuđman as the 
leader of a “joint criminal enterprise,” this seemed proof positive that he was 
guilty of aggression and genocide,56 even though the concept of joint criminal 
enterprise demands a much lower standard of evidence than is the norm for 
proving complicity in war crimes and was not used at Nuremberg but formu-
53 Duško Doder, “Yugoslavia: New Wars, Old Hatreds,” Foreign Affairs 91 (Summer 1993), 
pp. 3-23. Also Doder, The Yugoslavs, pp. 18-22, 35, 41, 219-23, for his views on Croatia and 
the Catholic Church, and his belief that during the 1960s Croats displayed a “fundamental 
weakness,” their “inability to check the revival of tribal hatred” among themselves, which so 
frightened the country’s “800,000 Serbs” [sic’c. 560,000] that they began to arm in self-defense. 
From 1948 to 1991, the number of Serbs in Croatia increased by 7 percent (from 543,795 
to 581,663), while the number of Croats in Serbia declined by 55 percent (from 169,864 to 
109,214); see Ivan Crkvenčić, “Croatian Ethnic Territory and the Multiethninc Composition 
of Croatia as a Result of Population Migrations,” Časopis za opća društvena pitanja 33-34 (1-2) 
(Zagreb), pp. 117-23, and Dražen Živić, “Demografski okvir i gubitci tijekom domovinskog rata 
i poraća 1991.-2001.,” in Zdenko Radelić, Davor Marijan, Nikica Barić, Albert Bing, and Dražen 
Živić, Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 2006), pp. 437-455.
54 Bogdan Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism. The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1994), passim, and “Learning from the Death of Yugoslavia: Nationalism 
and Democracy,” Social Text, 34 (1993), pp. 3-16.
55 Online at http://www.inthesetimes.com/issue/25/12/postel2512.html.
56 On-line at http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/history/facstaff/Ingrao/si/scholars.htm, 
for John B. Allcock, et al., “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 
Scholars’ Initiative website.
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lated by the Prosecution at the ICTY to overturn an acquittal.57 Led by Ivan 
Zvonimir Čičak, a student leader in the 1960s, the Croatian Helsinki Com-
mittee (CHC) also launched a series of attacks against Tuđman, the HDZ, and 
the Croatian government. The Croatian NGO defined its primary task as pro-
tecting Croatia’s Serbs from their government, and it reinforced Serb charges 
that they were threatened, e.g., accusations that the government had begun 
the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs from “all public services” in 1991 and that “the 
basis of the politics of the ruling party” was the “banishment [from Croatia] of 
members of the Serb minority and the prevention of their return.”58
Consolidating the image, 1993-1999
The Croat-Muslim war of 1993-1994, the third war of the Yugoslav suc-
cession, convinced most observers that Tuđman had conspired with Milošević 
to dismember Bosnia and Herzegovina and fixed his image as an aggressive 
nationalist.59 Reports that Bosnian Croats supported by Zagreb had “cleansed” 
and murdered Muslims in Central Bosnia made earlier Serb claims that they 
had been threatened in Croatia more credible and prepared the ground for 
later Serb accusations that the Croatian army engaged in mass murder and 
ethnic cleansing during military offensives in 1995. By the time that the Day-
ton Peace Accords were concluded later that year, Tuđman’s image was firmly 
established as a nationalist who tolerated racism and nursed a benign attitude 
toward genocide.60
57 Allison M. Danner and Jenny S. Martinez, “Guilty Associations, Joint Criminal Enterprise, 
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Law,” International Law 
Workshop, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, Paper No. 3, 1-77.
58 Online at www.hho.hr, www.minelres.lv/reports/croatia/NGO/croatia, www.hrw.org/press/
cicak.htm, and Statement No. 61, I. Z. Čičak, 25 November 1997.
59  Among those who believe Tuđman did so are Attila Hoare, “The Croatian Project to 
Partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990-1994,” East European Quarterly 31(1) (March 1997), pp. 
121-38; Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding Bosnia’s War (London: Simon & Schuster, 
1994), passim; Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia. The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing (College 
Station: Texas A&M UP, 1995), passim; and Michael Anthony Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion 
and Genocide in Bosnia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), passim. Allcock, et 
al., “The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” claim that “discussions 
between Tudjman and Milošević at Karađorđevo, on the subject of the partition of Bosnia, and 
subsequent negotiations in Graz, have been well-documented, and are no longer regarded as 
contentious,” a surprising assertion, given that there is no record of the meeting at Karađorđevo 
and no conspiracy between Tuđman and Milošević has been documented.  For discussion, see 
Ivo Lučić, “Karađorđevo: politički mit ili dogovor?” 35 (1) Časopis za suvremenu povijest (2003), 
pp. 7-36; James J. Sadkovich, “Franjo Tuđman and the Muslim-Croat War,” Review of Croatian 
History, 1 (2006), pp. 207-45; and Miroslav Tuđman, Vrijeme krivokletnika (Zagreb: Detecta, 
2006).
60 William Pfaff, “Invitation to War,” Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993); Robert Hislope, “Intra-
Ethnic Conflict in Croatia and Serbia: Flanking and the Consequences for Democracy,” East 
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By then, nationalism had been identified as the primary cause of the wars 
in Yugoslavia, and it had become fashionable to speak of nations as “imagi-
nary” communities, to decry as intolerant all those who viewed others as dif-
ferent than themselves, and to deploy the loose postulates and disparate meth-
odologies of postmodernism to discredit nationalism in general and Tuđman 
in particular.61 Eugene Hammel saw “Balkan society” as “a frightening mirror 
of our own” society, caught fast in “Neolithic thinking” and bereft of “a culture 
of civil rights and citizenship,”62 while Robert Hayden argued that proponents 
of “extreme nationalism” had resorted to ethnic cleansing in an effort to rec-
reate “imagined communities” by “unmixing” “existing heterogeneous ones.” 
According to Hayden, the logic of “national self-determination” legitimated 
the “process” of “homogenization” and triggered wars that followed “this logic 
of establishing the nation-state by eliminating minorities,” and Tuđman and 
other “extreme” nationalists were negating “social reality in order to recon-
struct it.” “Ethnic cleansing” then was less a concrete event than a theoretical 
encounter, “a manifestation of the incompatibility of the objectified or reified 
cultures at the base of the several nationalist enterprises with the living cul-
tures of the areas that have been the sites of the worst violence . . . .”63
For the uninitiated, such abstractions might seem to have little to do with 
reality, but Thomas Cushman, who was himself critical of Tuđman and na-
tionalism, was concerned that “the ethical and moral implications” of such 
arguments “reproduce[d] some basic tenets of Serbian nationalist accounts of 
the breakup of Yugoslavia” and “equalize[d] victims and perpetrators in as-
signing responsibility” for the wars that accompanied Yugoslavia’s disintegra-
tion.64 In other words, the right heuristic language and the right postmodern 
analysis could effectively diffuse the guilt for what had occurred between 1991 
and 1995—and presenting Tuđman as an authoritarian nationalist effectively 
rationalized, excused, or mitigated actions by the JNA and by Serb and Mus-
lim nationalists. Or as Cushman put it during a very frank exchange in An-
thropological Theory in 2005, in the accounts by Denich and Hayden he “saw 
European Quarterly (Winter 1996) 30(4), pp. 471-94; and Dijana Pleština, “Democracy and 
Nationalism in Croatia: The First Three Years,” in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiš S. Adamovich, 
Beyond Yugoslavia. Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder: 
Westview, 1995).
61 For example, Robert Hayden, “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population 
Transfers,” Slavic Review 55 (7) (Winter 1996), pp. 27-48. For a discussion of how postmodern 
concepts have distorted analysis, see James J. Sadkovich, “Postmodernističke teorijom, vođene 
metodologije, Franjo Tuđman, ratovi u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, i povijest,” Pilar. Časopis za društvene 
i humanističke studije (Zagreb), 6 (2) (2008), pp. 23-43.
62 E. A. Hammel, “Ethnicity and Politics: Yugoslav Lessons for Home,” The Anthropology of East 
Europe Review 15 (2) (Autumn 1997).
63 Robert Hayden, “Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic 
Cleansing in Yugoslavia,” American Ethnologist 23 (4) (November 1996), pp. 783-801.
64 Thomas Cushman, “Letter,” Slavic Review 60 (3) (Autumn 2001), p. 702.
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not only the elision and denial of the experiences of Croatian and Bosnian 
victims of Serbian aggression, but also—and most importantly—a degree of 
moral equivalence which described the victims of atrocities as the cause of 
not only the dissolution of Yugoslavia, but the war itself.” Denich defended 
herself in part by arguing that Cushman had damaged her reputation and mis-
represented her work as pro-Serbian, in part by arguing that her “interpreta-
tion precisely focuses on the mutually reinforcing interaction between Serbian 
and Croatian nationalists, not on the exclusive culpability (or innocence) of 
either”--a position that did indeed seem to diffuse responsibility.  Denich’s 
claim that Tuđman’s “nationalist government” had revived “Ustasha symbols 
and policies” also seemed to confirm Cushman’s impression that her account, 
like Hayden’s, implied that Croatia was at fault for the Serbian attack on it.65 
Like many postmodern accounts, it assigned priority to abstractions, such as 
symbols, in favor of ignoring concrete events, such as the JNA’s support of Ser-
bian separatists in Croatia. 
Context, policy proposals, and a priori assumptions
Many of these books and articles appeared during the early stages of what 
James Gow calls the “Serbian project,” the effort by some Serbian leaders to 
create a Greater Serbia on the ruins of Yugoslavia by using the Yugoslav army 
and Serb paramilitary groups to seize and occupy lands in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and then “cleanse” them of their Croat and Muslim inhabit-
ants.66 Others appeared during the wars of the Yugoslav succession and some 
65 Denich claimed Cushman had damaged her reputation, and Hayden accused the journal’s 
editor, Richard Ashby Wilson, of having allowed Cushman to make ad hominem attacks on 
him, his wife, and Denich. Cushman responded by noting that an “ad hominem attack involves 
using arguments about a person’s qualities or characteristics to discredit his or her argument,” 
but that he had avoided doing so.  However, Cushman implied that Hayden had done so. “In our 
intellectual battles,” he wrote, “Hayden has never centrally addressed my arguments, but instead 
has resorted to tautological legalistic arguments, threats of legal action, professions of outrage, 
and now, it seems, assaults on my character and ethics.” The journal’s former editor, Richard 
Ashby Wilson, was both bemused and alarmed. “My aim,” he explained, “was to generate more 
scholarly debate about the analyses of scholars” on Yugoslavia’s dissolution, and he found it 
“genuinely perplexing” that Hayden and Denich had responded so strongly, “given the frequently 
heated nature of scholarly and political disagreement over responsibility for the Balkan conflict.” 
Wilson also thought it unreasonable of Hayden and Denich to claim the “right” “to scrutinize 
and possibly censor articles before publication,” a position at odds with the freedom of scholars 
“to challenge one another’s position in a free and open debate.” The exchange in Anthropological 
Theory 5 (2005), pp. 545-77, was over “Anthropology and Genocide in the Balkans: An Analysis 
of Conceptual Practices of Power,” Anthropological Theory 4 (2004), 5-28, a reprint of Critical 
Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia (Seattle: The Donald M. Treadgold Papers in Russian, 
East European, and Central Asian Studies\, 1997).
66 James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), passim.
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just after their conclusion, during a period in which advocates of “transitional 
justice” sought to discredit those who had led Croatia and Serbia from 1990 
to 1995, but largely ignored former members of the communist regime that 
had preceded them. Most advocated some sort of policy—the preservation of 
a Yugoslav state, increased intervention by NGOs, intervention to protect a 
putatively “multi-cultural” Bosnia and Herzegovina, neutrality by the major 
powers, and so on.67  After 1995, memoirs and analyses of the wars included 
policy recommendations, now unfortunately a requirement by organizations 
like IREX, even though it is a practice that confounds detached analysis with 
political diagnosis, advocacy, and prescription.
For example, Steven Burg and Paul Shoup concluded their study of the war 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina by blaming the “authoritarian regimes” in Serbia 
and Croatia—the post-1989 regimes led by Milošević and Tuđman, not the 
Communist regimes directed by Stambolić and Račan—for having employed 
“force to achieve their ends in Bosnia.” To prevent similar events, they offered 
their own model of conflict prevention.68 Warren Zimmermann, America’s 
“last” ambassador to Yugoslavia was so distressed by the victories of “national-
ist” parties in democratic elections and the lack of “curbs” on their “potentially 
nondemocratic behavior” that he questioned the usefulness of free elections 
and suggested that self-determination be allowed only when it “won’t adverse-
ly affect the interests of other states or peoples.”69 The American diplomat ap-
pears to have had a weak grasp of the concepts of sovereignty and national 
self-determination. Even so, his suggestions were in line with the thinking and 
policy recommendations of academics like Burg, Shoup, and David Campbell, 
who echoed Zimmermann when he suggested that, “Discriminatory fund-
ing in favour of multicultural political forces, and withholding it from oth-
ers, would have been one concrete manifestation of the ethos of democracy.”70 
Like Mr. Zimmermann, Dr. Campbell appears to have had a weak grasp of the 
concept of national sovereignty, and his suggestion appears to give the “ethos” 
of democracy, a problematic abstraction, priority over the actual practice of 
democracy, something which can be measured, however imperfectly.
The influence of journalists, government-sponsored organizations, NGOs, 
and Tuđman’s domestic critics is clear in Campbell’s work. He cited, inter alia, 
The New York Times, OMRI (Open Media Research Institute), Daily Digest 
67 For example, the essays in Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, eds., Preventing 
Conflict in the Post-Communist World. Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution/Brookings Occasional Papers, 1996).
68 Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Conflict and 
International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 389-98.
69 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe.  Yugoslavia and its Destroyers.  America’s 
Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Time Books/Random House, 
1996), pp. 68, 130, 277-78.
70 David Campbell, National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 9-10, 55-6, 223-4, 281.
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(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty), BosNet (a resource for “friends of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina”), and selected works by Slavenka Drakulić, Bogdan Denitch, 
Ivo Goldstein, and Ivo Banac. Drakulić, Denitch, and Goldstein were all vo-
ciferous opponents of Tuđman and the HDZ, and Banac became a consistent 
critic of Tuđman during the Croat-Muslim war and helped contribute to the 
image of the HDZ leader as a Croatian version of Milošević. However, unlike 
many commentators, Banac scrupulously distinguished Croatian from Serbi-
an nationalism; stressed the “Jacobin” nature of Starčević‘s ideas; and under-
scored Tuđman’s concessions to Croatia’s Serbs, his efforts to limit the conflict 
in Croatia, and the problems he faced in overseeing a transition from a one-
party communist regime to a multiparty society, including the need to create a 
new, post-communist Croatian elite and defend his country against aggression 
by Serbian forces and the Yugoslav military.71 His criticism of Tuđman rein-
forced the negative image of the Croatian leader and his government proffered 
by Hayden, Denich, Zimmermann, and others, but Banac offered a scholarly 
analysis, not a policy proposal nor a polemic, giving his criticisms nuance and 
making them qualitatively different from those of the Croatian leader’s more 
hostile critics.
While more self-consciously analytical than polemical, policy proposals 
are nonetheless not detached analysis. Nor were calls for a multicultural solu-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina detached analysis; they were partisan varia-
tions of earlier efforts to hold Yugoslavia together, whether King Alexander’s 
efforts to create a Yugoslav state by imposing a royal dictatorship with fas-
cist trappings or Tito’s attempts to resolve the national question by imposing 
“brotherhood and unity” on Yugoslavia’s disparate nationalities. Nonetheless, 
demands for multiculturalism, claims that civil society was both the litmus 
test for a viable society and the panacea for all social ills, and the need to guar-
antee the substance, not merely the forms, of democracy came to dominate 
the “discourse” on the Yugoslav wars of succession.72 Particularly surprising 
was the ubiquitous multicultural reading of the region’s history, given that the 
multinational polities in the region had been segmented societies, with na-
tionalities living in the same locales but leading separate lives.73  Not histori-
71 Ivo Banac, Raspad Jugoslavije. Eseji o nacionalizmu i nacionalnim sukobima.  (Zagreb: 
Durieux, 2001), pp. 33-32, 133-4, 144-7, considered the HDZ to be an integral nationalist party 
and criticized Tuđman for tolerating anti-Serb policies and corruption, for his harassment of 
the media, and for his efforts to bring all Croats into a Croat state via “humane” transfers of 
population and exchanges of territory, policies similar to those pursued by Milošević.
72 For example, Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition 
Betrayed (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), passim.
73 Prior to Donia and Fine’s work, histories of the region tended to view it as segmented and 
fragmented, e.g., Jozo Tomašević Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1955), Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 
1962-1991 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), or Atif Purivatra, Jugoslavenska 
muslimanska organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca (Sarajevo: 
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cally accurate, a multicultural reading of history was nonetheless a necessary 
fiction favored by those promoting multicultural models because the “special 
conditions needed to resolve the problems created by multinational societies 
appear to be “rare” and all solutions unsatisfactory, so much so that a truly 
“democratic” solution—as opposed to those proposed by Zimmermann and 
Campbell—would have included “separation” as a viable option.74
Of course, separation and the fragmentation of existing political units were 
not acceptable to those who favored a multi-cultural position. Advocates of 
multiculturalism initially supported the preservation of the existing Yugoslav 
state, and when this proved impossible, a centralized Bosnian state. These were 
neither logically consistent nor practical positions, given the fragility of mul-
tinational polities, the national politics of the former communist regime, and 
the nationalist programs of all dominant parties. That the international com-
munity urged the preservation of democratic multinational societies, which 
then elected national parties to office, resulted in the dilemma that so vexed 
Zimmermann and Campbell, and ultimately led to a series of wars that pallia-
tives, improvisation, and politically correct solutions (containing the conflicts, 
mediation, and delivery of humanitarian aid) could not resolve. It therefore 
became essential to identify both the source of the conflicts, which many be-
lieved was Serbian and Croatian (but not Muslim) nationalism, and the reason 
they had spread, which many located in the recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
For example, in 1994, the former Finnish diplomat Maritti Koskenniemi 
argued in the pages of The International and Comparative Law Quarterly that 
recognition had been both premature and a violation of the human rights of 
its Serb inhabitants, because the “internal legitimacy” of both states had been 
questionable and because recognition had transformed legitimate Serb efforts 
to realize self-determination into unlawful aggression.75 Susan Woodward 
agreed and concluded that in addition to impersonal forces and competing 
nationalisms, German unification and Austria’s “century-old enmity toward 
Serbia” had triggered hostilities in Croatia. She argued that beginning in “the 
mid-1980s” Austria and the Vatican “had pursued a strategy to increase their 
sphere of economic and spiritual influence in central and eastern Europe,” and 
that by March 1991 “Germany had already joined the ranks of Austria, Hunga-
ry, and Denmark in at least covert support and encouragement of Slovene and 
Svjetlost, 1974); for discussion, see Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), and James J. 
Sadkovich, AReconsidering Bosnia-Herzegovina,@ online at http://www.spacesofidentity.net/.
74 Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 149-56.
75 Maritti Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (2) (April 1994), pp. 241-69.
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Croatian independence.”76 Similarly Damir Mirković, a professor at Canada’s 
Brandon University and an associate of the Australian Institute for Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies, claimed that Austria, Germany, Hungary, the USSR, 
and the Vatican had conspired to kindle conflict in Yugoslavia. He also accused 
Tuđman’s government of associating itself with the 1941-45 Ustaša state and 
practicing “cultural genocide” by requiring paramilitary groups to surrender 
their firearms.77
In sum, Yugoslavia’s breakup was purportedly the consequence of the rise 
of nationalist forces in Croatia whose politics were separatist, whose leaders 
were authoritarian, and whose support, albeit covert, came from a group of 
mostly Catholic states. Serbian leaders may have thought this to be true—
Milošević apparently worried that Germany, Hungary, Austria, and the CSCE 
(Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, later OSCE) were try-
ing to recreate the “Berlin-Tokyo axis”78--but it is surprising that anyone else 
accepted such arguments. Yet they persisted, in part because they could be 
neither proved nor disproved, in part because rebuttals appeared late,79 and 
in part because their authors had a wide audience—Brookings Institute pub-
lished Woodward’s analysis; Foreign Affairs published the essays by Rusinow 
and Doder; Mirković’s arguments appeared in the Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences; Hayden’s pieces were published in 
Slavic Review, East European Politics and Societies, and anthropology journals, 
which also published Bette Denich and Eugene Hammel;80 and in the United 
76 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and the Dissolution of Yugoslav after the Cold 
War (Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 1995), pp. 13-19, 139-49, 153, 159-62, 165.
77 Damir Mirković, “Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing in 
the Former Yugoslavia,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 548 
(November 1996), pp. 191-99, and “The Historical Link between the Ustasha Genocide and the 
Croato-Serb Civil War: 1991-1995,” Journal of Genocide Research 2 (3) (November 2000), pp. 
363-373.
78 Borisav Jović, The Last Days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FBIS, 22 October 
22, 1996 translation of Poslednji dani SFRJ : izvodi iz dnevnika (Beograd: Politika, Izdavačka 
delatnost, 1995), pp. 20, 24, 25, 26, 30 June 1991.
79 In “Jasenovac and the Manipulation of History,” 590, Boban noted that, “Destroyed and 
vanished—as opposed to real—evidence is always fertile ground for mystification.” It seems that 
this is true of a lack of reliable information, as was the case during the 1990s. Also Sabrina P. 
Ramet and Letty Coffin, “German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991-
1999,” Problems of Post-Communism (January/February 2001), pp. 48-50.
80 Mirković argued that Hayden had helped people to remember the “forgotten” genocide of 
Serbs by Croats during World War II in The Genocide Forum, Year 5, No. 4, online at http://
www.chgs.umn.edu/Educational_Resources/Newsletter/The_Genocide_Forum/Yr_5/
Year_5__No__4/year_5__no__4.html. Also see the exchange between Hayden and Cushman in 
Anthropological Theory 5 (2005), pp. 545-54, 559-64, for Hayden’s argument that his ideas, like 
those of Woodward, were correct because they were so widely read and cited, a logic Cushman 
found fallacious and certainly one that confuses popularity with coherent argument. 
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States and Great Britain left-wing publications repeatedly criticized Tuđman, 
his party, and his government.81
Although the emphasis shifted to implementing the Dayton Accords af-
ter 1995, criticism of Tuđman and his government continued because Zagreb 
was seen as impeding progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina; domestic clashes 
between the HDZ and the opposition took center stage in Croatia; and the 
United States began to put pressure on Croatia to amnesty accused Serb war 
criminals and facilitate the return of Serbs who had left the country during 
the war.82 In 1996, Ian Kearns, then a lecturer in politics at the University of 
Sheffield, informed the readers of Political Quarterly that Croatia was “a new 
edifice of authoritarian power,”83 and the following year, Gordana Uzelac, a so-
ciologist, argued that Tuđman was “authoritarian.”84 In 1998, Bruno Dallago, a 
professor at the University of Trento, and Milica Uvalic, then a professor at Pe-
rugia and later Yugoslavia’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Economic Relations, ar-
gued in Europe-Asia Studies that privatization was a form of expropriation and 
that nationalism caused economic misery. Dallago and Uvalic laid the blame 
for Croatia’s misfortunes during the early 1990s squarely on the shoulders of 
Tuđman’s government, arguing that amendments to the Croatian constitution 
in 1990 had “deprived” the country’s Serbs of their “status as a nation” and 
their “rights” as individuals, and that Tuđman’s brand of “nationalism” had 
led to the rapid increase in income gaps in Croatia, which surged from 10:1 in 
1989 to 67:1 by 1993,85 still well behind the income gaps that characterize the 
United States, where CEOs make 500 times what workers do, but large enough 
to condemn Tuđman and his party as corrupt, authoritarian nationalists.
Consensus
By the late 1990s, nationalism, and Serbian and Croatian nationalism in 
particular, had become the sufficient cause of Yugoslavia’s demise. Slovenian 
nationalists, who had squared off against their Serbian counterparts in the late 
1980s, had also engaged in a “Balkanist” discourse and had worked with the 
81 Sadkovich, “Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman,” passim.
82 See Albert Bing, “Hrvatska u međunarodnoj zajednici,” in Radelić, et al., Stvaranje hrvatske 
države i Domovinski rat.
83 Ian Kearns, ACroatian Politics: The New Authoritarianism,@ Political Quarterly (January-
March 1996), 67 (1), pp. 26-35.
84 Gordana Uzelac, “Franjo Tudjman’s Nationalist Ideology,” East European Quarterly 31(4) 
(Winter 1997), pp. 449-472, has since written various works on nations and nationalism, 
including The Development of the Croatian Nation: An Historical and Sociological Analysis 
(Caredigion: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2006). She teaches sociology at London Metropolitan 
University.
85 Bruno Dallago and Milica Uvalic, “The Distributive Consequences of Nationalism: The Case 
of the Former Yugoslavia,” Europe-Asia Studies, 50 (1) (January 1998), pp. 71-90.
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Croatian government through mid 1991, but they were not considered cul-
pable because they had a well developed “civil society,” which included the 
rock band Laibach, whose members sported regalia reminiscent of the Nazis.86 
But Tuđman was portrayed as a borderline racist who ruled in an authoritarian 
manner, and Croatia was depicted as a state which regularly violated human 
rights, especially those of its Serbs. By 1999, this had become conventional 
wisdom, and a reviewer in the Royal Institute of International Affairs noted 
that many scholars believed that Croatia had “more in common” with Serbia 
than with Hungary or Poland, owing to its “poor human rights record and 
authoritarian-nationalist political character.”87
This view of Tuđman as both “authoritarian” and “nationalist,” and of Cro-
atia as a state with an authoritarian government persisted into the following 
decade and has become embedded in the literature. How pervasive this image 
is can be gauged from an article by John Mueller, the Woody Hayes Chair of 
National Security Studies at Ohio State University’s Mershon Center. Based 
on his reading of the literature in English, he concluded that there were no 
significant differences between the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda; that all 
belligerents in both conflicts shared a “common criminality”; and that “a large, 
impressively armed, and well-disciplined policing force could have been ef-
fective in policing the thug-dominated conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.”88 
Darya Pushkina, like Mueller, does not read Serbian, Croatian, or Bosnian, 
and so she depended heavily on Lenard Cohen’s Broken Bonds, a handful of 
UN documents, and two articles in The Guardian and The Washington Post. 
Not surprisingly, she came to similar conclusions and even accused Tuđman 
of having “developed” the practice of “ethnic cleansing” to rid Croatia of its 
Serbs.89 For Pushkina, it was axiomatic that he was a war criminal, just as for 
Mueller it was clear that he was not merely a nationalist, but someone who 
associated with thugs, a term also used by the British journalist Ed Vulliamy 
to describe Bosnian Croats in his award-winning book on the war in Bosnia.90 
The following year, 2001, Praeger published an analysis of the Croatian media 
by Stjepan Malović and Gary W. Selnow, who described Tuđman as “antidem-
86 Patrick Hyder Patterson, AOn the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, 
Austrian, and Italian Discourse,” Slavic Review 62 (1) (Spring 2003), pp. 110-41; for Laibach, see 
their DVDs and CDs, and Sabrina P. Ramet and Gordana P. Crnković, eds., Kazaaam!  Splaat! 
Ploof! The American Impact on European Popular Culture since 1945 (New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2003), pp. 183-5.
87 Adrian Hyde-Price, Review, Royal Institute of International Affairs 75 (4) (October 1999), pp. 
860-861.
88 John Mueller, “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War’,” International Security 25 (1) (Summer 2000), 
pp. 42-70. 
89 Darya Pushkina, “Towards Successful Peace-Keeping: Remembering Croatia,” Cooperation 
and Conflict 39 (2004), pp. 409-410, cites Cohen as the source for her conclusion.
90 Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell, passim, pp. 209-60; for a critique, see Sadkovich, “Franjo Tupman 
and the Muslim-Croat War,” p. 210.
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ocratic, powerful, authoritarian and . . . fascistic,”91 and Harper’s published ex-
cerpts from two transcripts of a meeting between Tuđman and members of his 
government in September 1993 which had been “obtained” by the American 
journalist Chris Hedges and supposedly showed that Tuđman had “planned 
ethnic cleansing and other war crimes,” including “Croatia’s final solution” of 
its Serbian problem.92
In 2003, Victor Peskin, a graduate student at Berkeley, and Mieczysław 
Boduszyński, a political scientist from San Diego State, portrayed the Croatian 
leader as an authoritarian ruler who had been (properly) indicted as the leader 
of a joint criminal enterprise,93 and Cambridge University Press published a 
study by the British sociologist Michael Mann, who argued that Tuđman and 
his government belonged on the “dark side” of democracy.94 In a talk at the 
Wilson Center in 2004, Boduszyński coupled the Croatian HDZ with Vojislav 
Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party and separated both from truly “democratic” par-
ties and “former communist parties in Eastern Europe” which had “genuinely 
transformed themselves into democratic organizations.” Boduszyński argued 
that their “record” during the 1990s “entirely justified” “concern” over the 
electoral victories of the HDZ and SRS in 2003, because their “legitimacy has 
been largely based on the illiberal nationalist projects of the 1990s, and not 
on progress in building democracy, reforming the economy and promoting 
international integration.” He acknowledged that the Serbian party was more 
recalcitrant than the Croatian, but he claimed that the “moderate” Ivo Sanader 
could only keep HDZ members in line by imposing a “hierarchical and un-
democratic party organization” which “ensure[s] that any illiberal tendencies 
are kept in check,”95 apparently confusing party discipline, one of the most 
91 Stjepan Malović and Gary W. Selnow, The People, Press, and Politics of Croatia (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 140.
92 (Chris Hedges), “Planning Croatia’s Final Solution,” Harper’s (December 2001). The article 
can be found in various websites, including that of The Centre for Peace in the Balkans, a Serbian 
organization based in Toronto which, inter alia, opposed NATO’s attack on Serbia in 1999; see 
http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index’article&articleid’13920.
93 Victor Peskin and Mieczys»aw P. Boduszyński, “International Justice and Domestic Politics: 
Post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” 
Europe-Asia Studies 55 (7) (2003), pp. 1117-42. Peskin’s research has been supported by the 
United States Institute of Peace, the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at UC San 
Diego, the Berkeley Center for African Studies, and the Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley. 
His articles have appeared in Europe-Asia Studies, Legal Affairs, International Peacekeeping, the 
Journal of Human Rights, and the Journal of International Criminal Justice.
94 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 369 ff., passim, bases his analysis of Tuđman on selected 
secondary sources rather than a careful reading of Tuđman’s work and a thorough examination 
of his actions.
95 Mieczyław Boduszyński, “The Return to Power of Nationalist Parties in Croatia and Serbia. 
What Does It Mean?” WWICS/EES, No. 296, 12 May 2004.
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basic requirements for a viable party system, with totalitarian and authoritar-
ian governance.
In 2004, Maple John Razsa, an anthropologist, and Nicole Lindstrom, a 
political scientist, published their critical analysis of Tuđman’s ABalkanist 
discourse”96; Darya Pushkina published an essay that implied Tuđman was 
to blame for the UN’s failure to carry out its mandate in Croatia97; and the 
ICTY reinforced the image of the former Croatian President as a bad actor by 
indicting six Bosnian Croats for war crimes and naming Franjo Tuđman as 
the leader of a “joint criminal enterprise,” along with Gojko Šušak, his former 
Minister of Defense, and Janko Bobetko, who had led Croatia’s armed forces 
from 1991 to 1995. The tribunal has also indicted Ante Gotovina, the com-
mander of Operation Storm, which had reclaimed Croatian territory occupied 
in 1991, for participating in a joint criminal enterprise that sought to expel 
Croatia’s Serbs.98
So it seemed that during the 1990s the Croatian government was a crimi-
nal organization, and it is not surprising that in a recent collection of articles 
on Croatia published by a Zagreb publishing house, Sabrina Ramet notes that 
Tuđman’s “regime” “promoted a traditionalist and exclusive vision of Croatia” 
(promicao je tradicionalističku i eksluzivističku viziju Hrvatske) as a Croat state 
in which Serbs were “unwelcome” (nisu dobrodošli). Although Ramet’s claim 
can be “contested,” the younger generation of scholars has learned this les-
son well. Peskin and Boduszyński assume that Tuđman was an authoritarian 
nationalist; Darya Pushkina thinks that he was a war criminal; Knut Vester-
dal believes that Tuđman and the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) “flirted 
with ideas that until then had been associated with the Ustaša movement” 
(očijukala [je] s idejama koje su se prije povezivale s ustaškim pokretom); and 
Marius Søberg sees Tuđman’s heritage as “xenophobia and nationalism” (kse-
nofobije i nacionalizma).99
96 Maple J. Razsa and Nicole Lindstrom, “Balkan is Beautiful: Balkanism in the Political 
Discourse of Tuđman’s Croatia,” East European Politics and Societies 18 (4) (2004), pp. 628-650. 
Razsa has made a number of documentary films and has worked with anarchists in Croatia. His 
dissertation is “Bastards of Utopia: An Ethnography of Radical Politics after Yugoslav Socialism.” 
A graduate of Syracuse University, Lindstrom teaches at Central European University in 
Budapest and was a visiting professor at The New School in New York.  Her dissertation was 
“Rethinking Sovereignty: The Politics of Europeanization in Europe’s Southeastern Periphery.”
97 Pushkina, “Towards Successful Peace-Keeping,” pp. 393-412.
98 ICTY, Indictment, Jadranko Prlić, et al., 2 March 2004; Indictment, Ante Govotina, et al., 21 
July 2006.
99 Sabrina Ramet, “Građanske vijednosti u demokratskoj tranziciji,” Knut Vesterdal, “Izgradnja 
liberalne demokracije u Hrvatskoj,” and Marius Søberg, “Hrvatska nakon 1989. Godine: HDZ 
i politika tranzicije,” in Sabrina Ramet and Davorka Matić, eds., Demokratska tranzicija u 
Hrvatskoj, transformacija vrijednosti, obrazovanje, mediji (Zagreb: Alinea, 2006), pp. 27, 40, 64, 
323, and passim.  Søberg and Vesderdal are graduate students at NTNU.
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Whether Tuđman was actually an authoritarian leader and the HDZ a xe-
nophobic party is another question, and one beyond the scope of this essay.100 
But it seems worth noting that the relative lack of information, exacerbated by 
the bias of those who knew something of Yugoslavia and the tendency to fo-
cus on particular questions and to view them through ideological lenses (e.g., 
analyzing the rights of Croatia’s Serbs or the plight of Bosnia’s Muslims based 
on multiculutralist assumptions) created a situation in which inaccurate in-
formation and propaganda transformed a dissident communist reformer into 
a rabid Croatian nationalist. Tuđman’s transformation suggests that much of 
what we know about “small peoples” and the less studied areas of the world 
is suspect because the sources on which we depend are both few and parti-
san. This observation is hardly unique and in many ways echoes the ideas of 
Edward Said and Maria Todorova. What is ironic is that those who embraced 
the theories of Said and Todorova also tended to be the most vociferous crit-
ics of Tuđman because their focus was on the rights of Serbs and the plight of 
Muslims to the exclusion of the rights, and the plight, of Croats. Consequently, 
the informational vacuum regarding Yugoslavia was filled with propaganda by 
Serbian nationalists, well-meaning arguments to preserve Yugoslavia and pro-
tect Muslims and Serbs, partisan scholarship, and sensational but often poorly 
informed reporting on Yugoslavia and the wars which attended its dissolution.
While the consensus regarding Franjo Tuđman has been widely accepted 
as true, it consists largely of assertion based on assumptions which may or may 
not be tenable, not on empirical historical studies, and it is also worth noting 
that the consensus does not obtain everywhere. There are other young schol-
ars who discern a more complex history in the events of the 1990s and some 
older ones who would agree that casting Tuđman as an authoritarian leader is 
not only a simplistic, but also an untenable, way to explain events during the 
1990s.101 It also seems worth noting that the stereotypes of Tuđman as an au-
thoritarian nationalist and Croats in general as prejudiced are not benign; they 
have shaped perceptions abroad and even led some scholars to suggest that the 
most effective way to deal with Croatia’s “national government” is to recruit 
locals to subvert it, using “civil-society representatives” as “agents of domestic 
change,” thereby recasting civil society as a subversive force and themselves 
as either outside agitators or idealistic revolutionaries, depending on one’s 
view regarding the importance of respecting a state’s sovereignty.102 Finally, it 
100 For discussion, see James J. Sadkovich, “A Historical Test Case: Was Franjo Tuđman an 
Authoritarian Nationalist?” Review of Croatian History 3 (1) (2007), pp. 219–249.
101 For example, the essays in Radelić, et al., Stvaranje hrvatske države i Domovinski rat.
102 Michael Merlingen and Zenet Mujic, “Public Diplomacy and the OSCE in the Age of Post-
International Politics: The Case of the Field Mission in Croatia,” Security Dialogue 34 (3) (2003), 
pp. 269-283, refer to Tuđman’s government as a “regime” and Serb refugees as “expellees.” They 
blame his “regime” for having obstructed the work of the OSCE before 2000, but the government 
led by reform forces for doing so after 2000, so they suggest using “subnational actors,” including 
“ordinary Croats and their civil-society representatives” as “effective agents of domestic change” 
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is worth noting that the historiographic problem is not one of “rival” or “con-
tested” or “competing” narratives, but rather of a lack of historical distance, a 
paucity of archival studies, and a tendency to copy and repeat what has been 
said and written, rather than question and re-evaluate earlier assumptions and 
claims.
We are just beginning to write the history of the 1990s, a process that will 
be neither easy nor short, and during which much of the models and theories 
that are now currently fashionable will fall away, because, as Fernand Braudel 
noted, when you float such devices down the stream of history, they inevita-
bly sink.103 Whether fifty years from now, after archives have been opened and 
their contents explored, historians will still conclude that Tuđman was both a 
nationalist and an authoritarian leader is impossible to predict, but it is unlikely 
that the current consensus will endure, given that even a superficial compari-
son of his nine years in power suggests significant differences with Yugoslavia’s 
truly authoritarian rulers, from King Alexander to Josip Broz Tito.  But that, of 
course, is not only the subject of a different essay, it is question that future histo-
rians will be better able to evaluate than we are able to do at present.
Vereinbarter Konsensus: Wie wurde Franjo Tuđman ein autoritärer 
Nationalist
Zusammenfassung
Wenn es überhaupt einen Konsensus in der Literatur über den Krieg für 
Jugoslawiens Sukzession gibt, ist es ganz gewiss der Konsensus darüber, dass 
Franjo Tuđman nicht nur ein Nationalist, sondern der autoritäre Nationalist 
war. Heute gibt es nur Wenige, die diese Einschätzung bezweifeln, aber vor 
1993 war Tuđmans Reputation ziemlich gemäßigt. Er war nicht nur Nation-
alist. Er kämpfte mit Partisanen in Jugoslawien während des Zweiten Welt-
krieges; er verfasste das preisgekrönte Buch über Partisanen-Kriegsführung 
und noch ein Buch, in dem er Tito verherrlichte; Tuđman war Mitglied der 
to undermine the “national government.” Merlingen teaches at Central European University; 
Mujic is with the OSCE mission in Kosovo.
103 Fernand Braudel, “History and the Social Sciences,” in On History (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 35-7, 45, also notes that social scientists evade historical explanation 
by focusing on the present.
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Redaktion der Jugoslawischen militärischen Enzyklopädie und erster Direktor 
des Instituts für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung in Kroatien, natürlich 
wurde er für diese Position von der Hierarchie der Kommunistischen Partei 
ausgewählt. Im Jahre 1972 war er zur Gefängnisstrafe wegen seiner Bemüh-
ungen um die Liberalisierung des jugoslawischen kommunistischen Systems 
verurteilt, 1981 musste er wieder ins Gefängnis, weil er mit fremden Journali-
sten gesprochen und in diesen Gesprächen Jugoslawiens Image angeschlagen 
hatte. In den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wurde er ein aufrühre-
rischer Dissident. Vor 1989 aber betrachteten die meisten Forscher Tuđman 
nicht als einen gefährlichen Nationalisten oder Rassisten, beziehungsweise au-
toritäre Persönlichkeit. Deswegen scheint uns vernünftig die Frage zu stellen, 
wie und seit wann er als ein „autoritärer Nationalist” gewöhnlicherweise por-
trätiert und fast regelmäßig mit dem serbischen Führer Slobodan Milošević 
verglichen wird.
